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I. INTRODUCTION 
While not every civil case goes before a jury, Louisiana recog-
nizes the right to a trial by jury under specified circumstances, which 
is way more restrictive than any of the other states, where trial by 
jury is commonplace.1 This is not surprising given the historical 
roots of Louisiana in the civil law tradition, but jury trials set Loui-
siana apart from other civil law jurisdictions, where juries are not 
used in civil trials and typically limited to felony criminal trials 
only.2 In jury trials, the jury then becomes the body that will decide 
 
 *   J.D./D.C.L. candidate (May 2022) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University. The author would like to thank Prof. William Corbett for his 
guidance throughout the writing of this case note. 
 1. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731(A) (2020). Louisiana had the 
highest jury threshold in the nation—no jury trial in cases that do not exceed 
$50,000. The state legislature passed Act No. 37 of the First Extraordinary Session 
of 2020, which lowers the amount to a case that “does not exceed $10,000.” This 
change takes effect Jan. 1, 2021 but is not retroactive. 
 2. Neither France nor Germany, for example, use juries in civil trials; in-
stead, they opt to use panels of judges for more efficient proceedings. See Daniel 
Soulez Larivière, Overview of the Problems of French Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 737, 737 (1997); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflec-
tions on the Comparisons of Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409 (1960). 




the fate of the parties on all issues of fact at the close of trial.3 Out-
side of the factual determinations made by the jury, judges resolve 
questions of law.4 One of the issues typically decided by a jury if it 
finds a defendant liable is the amount of damages to be awarded to 
a plaintiff. However, what happens when a judge disagrees with the 
jury verdict? Boothe discusses the power of the court to rectify what 
the court sees as a mistaken verdict by the jury.5 This note questions 
whether trial and appellate courts overstep their bounds by interfer-
ing with verdicts, and whether there is a better remedy than a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) for an improper jury 
verdict. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The issues in Boothe stem from a car accident in 2008.6 After 
dropping her daughter off at school, Sherry Boothe was driving on 
Greenwell Springs Road.7 On her drive, she crossed over the Comite 
River Bridge and lost control of her car and crashed it.8 Police re-
sponded to the accident and the officer, Lt. Ruiz, found ice on the 
bridge.9 The bridge then had to be sanded to remove the ice.10 Fol-
lowing the accident, Boothe sued the Department of Transportation 
and Development (“DOTD”) for her and her children’s injuries.11 
For Boothe to succeed, the elements she needed to prove were 
that: (1) the DOTD had custody of the bridge that caused her inju-
ries, (2) the bridge was defective because its icy condition created 
 
 3. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1736 (2020). “The trial of all issues 
for which a jury trial has been requested shall be by jury.” Determinations of law 
are made by the judge. 
 4. Question of law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “An issue 
to be decided by the judge, concerning the application or interpretation of law.” 
 5. Boothe v. Dep’t of Transportation & Dev. & Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 18-
1746 (La. 6/26/19), 285 So. 3d 451. 
 6. Id. at 453. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 454. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 




an unreasonable risk of harm, (3) the DOTD had actual or construc-
tive notice of the icy condition and did not take any corrective 
measures within a reasonable time, and (4) the icy condition was a 
cause-in-fact of Boothe’s injuries.12 After listening to the testimony 
of Ms. Boothe, Lt. Ruiz, and DOTD employees, the jury found that 
the DOTD was not at fault for Ms. Boothe’s injuries.13 
Following the verdict, Boothe filed a motion for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and an alternate motion for a new trial.14 
The Court granted the motion for JNOV and found in favor of 
Boothe, awarding her $919,191.20.15 In its decision, the District 
Court focused on the testimony of Lt. Ruiz and DOTD’s own em-
ployees, while mostly ignoring Boothe’s testimony.16 One DOTD 
employee admitted that while he normally has both sides of a bridge 
sanded when it is icy, they only sanded one side of the bridge in 
question.17 Combining that with Lt. Ruiz’s testimony that the bridge 
was icy and the other DOTD employees’ testimony that icy bridges 
are hazardous to motorists, the district court was convinced that the 
plaintiff satisfied all elements of her claim and found for her.18  
The DOTD then appealed to the First Circuit, where the JNOV 
was affirmed, but damages were altered.19 The First Circuit did not 
find that the almost $1-million award was an abuse of discretion, but 
it applied a statutory damages cap to reduce the award.20 The First 
Circuit instead characterized the award as “relatively high” and left 
 
 12. Id. at 456 (citing Comeaux v. Comeaux, 98-2378 (La. 7/7/99), 748 So.2d 
1123, 1127). 
 13. Id. at 453-54. 
 14. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1811 (2020). 
 15. Boothe, 285 So. 3d at 454. The new trial was conditionally granted as 
well. 
 16. Id. at 457. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 455. 
 20. Id. La. R.S. 13:5106 capped general damages at $500,000, so the court 
reduced the $600,000 general damage award accordingly. 




the special damages in place.21 Following this ruling, the DOTD ap-
pealed and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
III. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Court first addressed the DOTD’s assertion that granting 
and affirming the JNOV was improper.22 The DOTD’s assignment 
of error was that the evidence presented did not show that the con-
dition of the road presented an unreasonable risk to Boothe when 
she wrecked.23 In order to find that a JNOV is proper, the Court had 
to find that “evidence points so strongly in favor of the moving party 
that reasonable persons could not reach different conclusions, not 
merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the mover.”24 
The Supreme Court decided that the evidence did indeed meet this 
high standard and pointed towards the unrefuted testimony that the 
lower courts relied on.25 After affirming the JNOV, the Court moved 
on to the assessment of damages. 
Finding that there was an abuse of discretion by the district court 
in its $600,000 general award damage, the Supreme Court vacated 
it.26 In deciding this, the Court acknowledged that Boothe’s injuries 
were serious, but her doctor did not place any limits on her activi-
ties.27 The Court awarded a lesser amount of $300,000 in general 
damages.28 The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
and there were two dissents.29 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 456. 
 23. Id. at 458. 
 24. See Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc., 00-0628 (La. 10/30/00); 772 So. 
2d 94, at 99.  
 25. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
 26. Boothe, 285 So. 3d at 458. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 459 (citing Collins v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., 36-528 (La. App. 2 
Cir. 12/11/02); 833 So.2d 1166 as basis for their decision. There the Plaintiff was 
awarded $150,000). 
 29. Boothe, 285 So. 3d at 459. 




Justice Hughes’s dissent was based on the reduction of Boothe’s 
damage award.30 He considered the majority’s reduction as superfi-
cial and thought the amount was “picked out of thin air.”31 Justice 
Hughes would have affirmed the decision from the appeals court.32 
In his dissent, Justice Crichton writes that he believes that the 
trial court substituted its judgment for the jury’s.33 Justice Crichton 
saw the trial court evaluated witness credibility inappropriately and 
did not resolve factual questions in favor of the DOTD.34 Crichton 
would have reinstated the jury’s verdict.35 
IV. COMMENTARY 
While none of the three courts that heard Boothe disagreed with 
granting the JNOV, the Louisiana Supreme Court had one justice 
that thought that the JNOV should not have been granted. There may 
have been a less intrusive remedy that the Court could have given 
the plaintiff after deciding that the jury verdict was incorrect. The 
Boothe decision risks that JNOVs that do not meet the high standard 
may be granted more often. 
A. Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto 
Awarding a JNOV to a party means taking away the verdict that 
a panel of jurors decided, so anytime this motion is granted it should 
bear some scrutiny. The Code of Civil Procedure itself does not pro-
vide a detailed standard for granting one.36 The JNOV standard from 
Joseph is that “evidence points so strongly in favor of the moving 
party that reasonable persons could not reach different conclusions, 
not merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. In fact, there is no standard articulated in the Code that guides the judge. 
See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1811 (2020). 




mover.”37 Justice Crichton argues in his dissent in Boothe that the 
Court substituted its own judgment for the jury’s, raising further 
questions on whether reasonable persons could actually disagree.38 
If both a jury and a justice disagree on whether a verdict can 
withstand a JNOV motion, it is possible that the JNOV should not 
have been granted. If Justice Crichton is correct, then there is a ra-
tional worry that the role of the jury to decide a case can be inter-
fered with by a judge that thinks the jury’s determination of the facts 
is incorrect.39 While it seems that the Boothe case could have been 
decided either way, caution should be taken when deciding that the 
jury was incorrect. Different minds have indeed found that there 
could be two different conclusions. The Court may have come to the 
wrong conclusion in Boothe. 
The evidence here seemed to point somewhat towards liability 
for the DOTD, but having the power taken away from the jury when 
it is not absolutely clear that Boothe should have won defies the de-
manding JNOV standard. There is an alternative option for the Court 
that still leaves the decision to the jury. 
B. Granting a New Trial 
The Louisiana Supreme Court could have chosen to grant a new 
trial instead of a JNOV.40 If a party loses at trial, that party does not 
have to choose between moving for a JNOV or a new trial.41 Since 
both the new trial and the JNOV were granted by the district court, 
the Supreme Court could have determined that the higher standard 
for granting a JNOV was not met but sent the case back to be heard 
by another jury.42 The new trial standard “clearly contrary to the law 
 
 37. See Joseph, 772 So. 2d 94 at 99. 
 38. See Boothe, 258 So. 3d at 459. 
 39. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1736 (2020). 
 40. See id. at art. 1972(1): “A new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory 
motion of any party, in the following cases: when the verdict or judgment appears 
clearly contrary to the law and the evidence.” 
 41. See id. at art. 1811(A)(2). 
 42. Id. at art. 1811(C). If the court grants a JNOV, then the court is required 
to conditionally grant the motion for a new trial. Thus, if the court’s ruling for a 




and evidence” is lower than the Joseph standard for JNOV.43 Justice 
Crichton’s dissent argued that the trial judge assessed the witnesses’ 
credibility and drew her own inferences.44 When a trial court grants 
a new trial, the judge is allowed to both assess credibility and draw 
her own inferences.45 If Justice Crichton was correct, then the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court should have reversed the lower court on the 
JNOV, but left the provisional new trial in place.  
Granting a new trial over a JNOV still lets a jury decide the out-
come of the case rather than the judge fully invading the province of 
the jury. The jury is not there by accident, or automatically. A party 
to the suit must specifically ask for a jury trial in a pleading and pay 
a bond to the court for it.46 Further, a party is only eligible for a jury 
if the party’s cause of action is above a certain dollar amount.47 If 
there is a JNOV granted, a case in which a party that has a right to 
jury trial and has done all that is required to preserve that right has 
it taken away from the jury and goes back the hands of the judge. If 
the party who prayed for the jury and paid the bond is the losing 
party in the JNOV, this seems problematic.  
Granting a new trial, though, would avoid that problem by taking 
the case from the hands of one jury and placing it into the hands of 
another. So, the trier of fact is still a jury of their peers, rather than 
one judge. This is a much less radical remedy than a JNOV. In a 
case where the record does not clearly support a JNOV, the new trial 
is a much better intervention by the judge. 
 
JNOV is overturned on appeal, the appellate court can remand the case for a new 
trial. 
 43. See id. at art.1972(1). 
 44. See Boothe, 258 So. 3d at 459. 
 45. See Martin v. Heritage Manor South, 00-1023 (La. 4/31/01); 784 So. 2d 
627, 637. 
 46. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1733(A) (2020). 
 47. See id. at art. 1732(A)(1). 




C. Code of Civil Procedure Article 1732 Amendment 
One final consideration is whether there will be more JNOVs 
granted because the jury threshold has been lowered.48 Assuming 
that there will be more jury trials under the amended Louisiana Code 
of Civil Procedure article 1732(A)(1), there will likely be at least 
some uptick of motions for new trial and JNOV. If this is correct, 
then courts may be more likely to grant JNOVs, even if they do not 
unquestionably meet the Joseph standard. Because jury trials are 
more time-consuming and expensive than bench trials, an influx of 
trials that must be tried twice in front of a jury may strain the re-
sources of courts. If this is the case, then judges may decide that they 
can solve the problem by granting JNOVs on lesser evidence than 
in the past and save the courts time and money and strain on the 
resource of citizens serving on juries. It bears watching to see if this 
comes to fruition in coming days.  
 
 
 48. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(A)(1) (2021). The jury threshold 
is being lowered to $10,000 from $50,000, effective Jan. 1, 2021. 
 
